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I. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah Uniform Mediation Act of 2006 should in fact 
govern this case and if so, its affect on the questions presented for appeal? " 
"Statutory Construction is a question of law and is reviewed by the Court de 
novo. When interpreting court rules, we apply our rules of statutory construction 
with an understanding that rules, like statutes, are passed as a whole and not in 
parts or sections. [0]ur primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the 
rule-making body and to render all parts [of the rule] relevant and meaningful." 
Cox v. Krammer, 76 P.3d 184, 187 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)(alterations original). 
"We review for correctness questions regarding the law applicable in a case, 
including the issue of whether a given law can or should be applied retroactively." 
Goebel v. Salt Lake Southern Railroad Company, 104P.3d 1185, 1197 (Utah 
2004). 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 30, 2005, LWP Solutions, Inc. ("LWP") was asked to 
participate in a mediation of a dispute between Murlyn Craig Reese and Tingey 
Construction ("Tingey Construction") and/or Freemont Compensation Insurance 
Group. The mediation took place at the law offices of Richard Henriksen, attorney 
for plaintiff Reese. Paul Felt acted as the mediator of the dispute. R77. The 
1 
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mediation lasted all day but ultimately an agreement was not reached between 
Plaintiff Reese and LWP. Mr. Reese asked that LWP execute a Memorandum of 
Understanding during the mediation but LWP refused because the Memorandum 
of Understanding contained a term to which LWP had not agreed. 
Effective May 1, 2006, five months after the mediation between LWP, Mr. 
Reese and Tingey Construction, the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Section 
78-3 lc-101 et. seq., the Utah Uniform Mediation Act (the "Act"). Section 78-31 c-
114 of the Act provides as follows: 
(l)This chapter governs a mediation pursuant to a referral or an 
agreement to mediate made on or after May 1, 2006. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), on or after May 1, 2007, this chapter 
governs all agreements to mediate whenever made. 
At issue in this appeal is whether the Utah Uniform Mediation Act applies to 
the mediation between Mr. Reese, LWP and Tingey Construction since the 
mediation occurred five months prior to the Act's effective date, and indeed prior 
to the legislature considering the matter. Also relevant is what impact, if any, the 
Act has on the questions presented for appeal. 
The district court, in a hearing heard on May 22, 2006, granted Mr. Reese's 
request for discovery of mediation discussions so as to challenge LWP's claim that 
it did not reach an agreement with Mr. Reese during the mediation. In essence, 
though not functioning under or referencing the Utah Uniform Mediation Act of 
2 
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2006, the district court granted Mr. Reese an "exception" to the general rule set 
forth in Utah Code Section 78-3 lb-8 that precludes disclosure to third parties "any 
information about any ADR proceeding." See Section 78-3 lb-8(4). 
The Act also sets forth "Exceptions to privilege" at Section 78-3 lc-106. 
Section 78-31 c-106 provides as follows: 
(1) There is no privilege under Section 78-3 lc-104 for mediation 
communications that is: 
a. in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties 
to the agreement; 
, b. available to the public under Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act, or made 
during a mediation session which is open, or is required by 
law to be open, to the public; 
c. a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or 
commit a crime of violence; 
d. intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit or 
commit a crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing 
criminal activity; 
e. sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint 
of professional misconduct or malpractice file against a 
mediator; 
f. except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), sought or 
offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of 
professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a 
mediation party, nonparty participant, or representative of a 
party based on conduct occurring during a mediation; or 
g. sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, or exploitation in a proceeding in which a 
child or adult protective services agency is a party, unless 
the case is referred by a court to mediation and a public 
agency participates. 
(2) There is no privilege under Section 78-3 lc-104 if a court, 
administrative agency or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, 
that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence 
has shown that: 
3 
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a. the evidence is not otherwise available; 
b. there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs 
the interest in protecting confidentiality; and 
c. the mediation communication is sought or offered in: 
i. a court proceeding involving a felony or 
misdemeanor; or 
ii. except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), a 
proceeding to prove a claim to rescind or reform or a 
defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of 
the mediation. 
(3) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a 
mediation communication referred to in Subsection (l)(f) or 
(2)(c)(ii). 
(4) If a mediation communication is not privileged under Subsection 
(1) or (2), only the portion of the communication necessary for the 
application of the exception from nondisclosure may be admitted. 
Admission of evidence under Subsection (1) or (2) does not render 
the evidence, or any other mediation communication, discoverable 
or admissible for any other purpose. 
Section 78-3 lc-106. 
Most relevant here is § 78-31c-106(2)(c)(ii), which seems to provide for an 
exception to confidentiality to "rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability 
on a contract arising out of the mediation." This appears to be the section of 
the Act upon which Mr. Reese relies in asking the Court to affirm the district 
court's order granting him the right to conduct discovery into confidential 
mediation discussion. Later, LWP will prove that Mr. Reese has misread this 
section and taken it out of context and that it does not provide Mr. Reese with 
the relief he seeks. 
4 
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III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. does not believe that the Act does or should 
govern this case. 
Mediation discussions are confidential pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
31b-08, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31c-101 et. seq., Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of 
Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution, and Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The district court erred when it ordered that LWP's counsel could be 
deposed regarding confidential mediation discussions. 
The Utah Uniform Mediation Act (the "Act") does not apply to the 
mediation between Mr. Reese, LWP and Tingey Construction because the Act is 
intended to apply retroactively only to agreements "to mediate" and not to 
mediation which have already occurred. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-114. 
Moreover, if the Act were to apply to the mediation between Mr. Reese, 
LWP and Tingey Construction, §78-31c-106(l)(a) only provides for an exception 
to confidentiality for written agreements. Moreover, § 78-31c-106(2)(c)(ii) only 
provides for an exception to confidentiality to "rescind or reform or a defense to 
avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation" but not for litigation 
involving the proof of the existence of a contract itself. Section 78-3lc-
106(2)(c)(ii) presupposes the existence of a contract that the parties are seeking to 
5 
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modify or avoid. Section 78-31 c-106(2)(c)(ii) does not allow an exception from 
privilege to prove the existence of a contract. 
If, in the alternative, the Act intends to modify the Utah rule that parties 
need to protect themselves and reduce all agreements to some form of writing prior 
to the end of the mediation, see Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999), then the Act is a substantive change in the law which cannot be applied 
retroactively to LWP. Such an effect would be an attempt to govern activity after 
it occurred. 
The courts are not to delve into confidential mediation discussions to 
determine whether an oral agreement was reached during mediation. The bright-
line rule is that oral agreements made during mediation will not be enforced by the 
courts and LWP refused to execute any "Memorandum of Understanding" that was 
presented to it at the end of the mediation because the memorandum contained a 
term to which it did not agree. LWP communicated its refusal plainly to the others 
at the mediation. This is conclusive proof that the parties do not have an 
enforceable agreement. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The Utah Uniform Mediation Act Does Not Apply to This Appeal. 
A. Retroactivity is Disfavored in the Law. 
6 
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"Generally, legislation is not given retroactive effect. Utah Code section 68-
3-3 codified this principle, stating that 'no part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so stated.'" B.A.M. Development L.L.C. v. Salt Lake 
County, 128 P.3d 1161, 1166 (Utah 2006) (quoting Utah Code § 68-3-3 (2004)). 
Stated differently, "[a] statute is not to be applied retroactively unless the statute 
expressly declares that it operates retroactively." Goebel v. Salt Lake Southern 
Railroad Company, 104 P.3d 1185, 1197-98 (Utah 2004). 
"
4[A]s a general rule, retroactivity is not favored in the law.'" B.A.M., 128 
P.3d at 1166. "[T]he rule against retroactivity applies only where a statute 
implicates substantive laws. By contrast, 'statutes that do not "enlarge, eliminate, 
or destroy" substantive rights can be applied retroactively.'" Id. (citations 
omitted). "Convenience, reasonableness, and justice are factors we consider in 
deciding whether a statute has a merely remedial or procedural purpose." Goebel, 
104P.3datll98. 
When analyzing whether applying a statute as amended would have 
retroactive effects inconsistent with the usual rule that legislation is 
deemed to be prospective, we should use a common sense, functional 
judgment about whether the new provision attaches new legal 
consequences to events completed before its enactment. This 
judgment should be informed and guided by familiar considerations of 
fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations. Considering 
the strong presumptions against retroactivity in the law, and the 
common sense, functional factors that we consider in deciding 
whether to apply a law retroactively, we should err on the side of 
finding a statute substantive if we have doubt about the issues. 
7 
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Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see also, Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre 
Investment Company, 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998) (noting that the Utah 
Supreme Court, "narrowly draws the boundaries of what constitutes a procedural 
statute.") (citations and quotations omitted)). 
"Procedural law 'prescribes the practice and procedure or the legal 
machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective.' In 
contrast, substantive law 'creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the 
parties which may give rise to a cause of action.'" Olsen, 956 P.2d at 261 (citations 
omitted). 
B. Utah Law and the Agreement between the Parties Required Any 
Settlement Reached In Mediation Be Reduced to Writing. 
The first inquiry in determining whether a statute has an impermissible 
retroactive affect is to determine if the statute changes the law. Prior to the 
enactment of the Act, Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), 
provided that statements made during a court-ordered mediation were confidential. 
The Court in Lyons stated, "'guarantee of confidentiality is essential to the proper 
functioning of a . . . settlement conference program.'" Id. at 1144 (quoting Clark 
v. Stapleton Corp., 957 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1992)). "'[Participants must trust 
that matters discussed at a conference will not be revealed to the judges.'" Id. 
The Court in Lyons plainly stated that "If settlement is agreed to, the parties 
are required to reduce the agreement to writing, and execute a mutual stipulation of 
8 
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dismissal before the appeal is considered resolved by the court." Id. at 1143. The 
Court also noted that it was the failure by the parties "to execute a signed 
agreement" which "created an additional dispute on top of the previously existing 
one." Id. Thus, it appeared to be law in Utah that mediation agreements should be 
reduced to writing.l 
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-08, Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of 
Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution, and Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence all protect mediation communication as confidential. These statutes and 
rules also precluded parties from introducing evidence of settlement discussions 
into evidence at trial. 
Moreover, Mr. Reese, LWP and Tingey Construction also expected and 
overtly agreed that any agreement reached during the mediation between the 
parties on December 30, 2005 would be reduced to writing. Mr. Reese has 
admitted that the mediator drafted a Memorandum of Understanding at the close of 
the mediation that LWP refused to sign. Thus, any argument by Mr. Reese that the 
parties did not intend the mediation agreement be reduced to writing is 
1
 This is further evidenced by the fact that the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed 
Alternative Dispute Resolution require mediation agreements be reduced to writing 
to be enforceable. While it is in dispute whether the court-annexed rules apply to 
the mediation involving Mr. Reese and LWP, it is clear that Mr. Reese, Tingey 
Construction and LWP expected that any agreement reached in the mediation 
would be reduced to writing and executed by the parties. Otherwise, the mediator 
would not have drafted the Memorandum of Understanding and presented it to the 
mediation participants for signature. 
9 
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disingenuous and disproved by the parties' own actions. The parties' behavior 
proves that the parties intended any agreements reached during the mediation be 
reduced to writing.2 Thus, prior to the affective date of the Act, LWP and Mr. 
Reese agreed that only written agreements between the parties would be 
enforceable. 
C The Act Expressly Provides for Specific Limited Retroactive 
Application, But the Act Doesn 't Apply to This Appeal. 
Section 78-3 lc-114(1) specifically provides for an effective date of May 1, 
2006. However, § 78-3 lc-114(2) plainly states that "on or after May 1, 2007, this 
chapter governs all agreements to mediate whenever made." See Olsen, 956 P.2d 
at 262 (noting the courts do not "apply retroactively legislative enactments that 
alter substantive law or affect vested rights unless the legislature has clearly 
expressed that intention"). 
1. The Act Only Applies to Agreements to Mediate At a Future Date. 
However, the Act—even if applied retroactively—does not affect this appeal. 
The legislature plainly stated that the Act would apply to "agreements to mediate." 
"Because we assume that the legislature used each term in the statute advisedly, we 
2
 Obviously, LWP's refusal to execute the Memorandum of Understanding is 
a clear manifestation of LWP's intent not to be bound by the writing or any alleged 
oral agreement evidenced therein. 
10 
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read the statute's words literally 'unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable.'" Id. at 259 (citations omitted). 
Here, the use of the prepositional phrase, "to mediate" suggests some future 
action and does not encompass mediations that have already occurred. The plain, 
ordinary language of the Act suggests that the Act (even if applied retroactively) 
does not apply to mediations that have already been completed. The Act, by its 
plain language, intends only to apply to mediations that are to come. 
This interpretation of the Act is consistent with "common sense [and] 
functional judgment about whether the new provision attaches new legal 
consequences to events completed before its enactment." Goebel, 104 P.3d at 
1198. It is hard to believe that the Act would control a mediation that is over and 
done with. Common sense dictates that the Act not apply to the mediation 
between Mr. Reese and LWP because such mediation is already completed. 
2. Exception to Confidentiality Does Not Apply to Oral Contracts or When 
the Existence of the Contract is in Dispute. 
Section 78-3 lc-106 of the 2006 Act sets forth the exceptions to the general 
rule that all mediation communications are confidential. Section 78-31c-106(l)(a) 
states that there is no privilege under the Act for a mediation communication that is 
"an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement." 
Thus, pursuant to this section, a party may seek to enforce a written mediation 
11 
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agreement that is signed by all parties to the agreement without running afoul of 
confidential mediation communications. 
What is most relevant is that § 78-3 lc-106 does not provide for an 
exemption from privilege for the enforcement of oral mediation agreements. As 
the court in Vernon v. Action, 732 N.E.2d 805 (Ind. 2000), stated: 
[The exception from confidentiality for a final written document] is 
noteworthy only for what it does not include: oral agreements. The 
disadvantage of exempting oral settlements is that nearly everything 
said during a mediation session could bear on either whether the 
disputants came to an agreement or the content of the agreement. In 
other words, an exception for oral agreements has the potential to 
swallow the rule. 
Id. at 809-10. 
The legislature chose to adopt a section of the Act that sets forth those 
instances in which the confidentiality privilege does not apply. The legislature 
specifically mentioned instances involving written contracts but failed to mention 
oral contracts. Courts assume that the legislature uses language advisedly and, as a 
consequence, presume that the expression of one thing should be interpreted as the 
exclusion of another. See State v. Jacobs, 144 P.3d 226, 228-29 (Utah App. 2006) 
(noting that the inclusion of one item is seen as the exclusion of another). Thus, 
this Court should view the legislature's omission of oral contracts in this portion of 
the statute as purposeful and conclude that there is no exemption to the 
confidentiality privilege for the enforcement of oral contracts. See id. Any 
12 
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attempt by Mr. Reese to rely upon § 78-3 lc-106 as grounds for allowing him to 
prove the existence of an oral contract is without merit. 
In similar vein, § 78-31 c-106(2)(c)(ii) does not allow Mr. Reese to prove the 
existence of his alleged contract. Section 78-3 lc-106(2)(c)(ii) provides an 
exception to the confidentiality privilege in a proceeding "to prove a claim to 
rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of 
mediation." (Emphasis added). 
The plain language of the Act limits this exception to the confidentiality 
privilege only to instances when a party seeks to rescind, reform or avoid liability 
on a contract. Based on the plain language of the statute, the exception to 
confidentiality addressed in 2(c)(ii) is limited only to circumstances when there is 
no doubt that a contract exists. The legislature did not provide that the 
confidentially privilege is waived so that a party can prove the existence of a 
contract. It is unreasonable that the legislature would pass an Act that promotes 
confidentiality, only to abrogate it totally in a section that allows for that the 
introduction of evidence to prove an agreement that has not been reduced to 
writing. The most reasonable interpretation of the Act is that only written 
3
 Section 78-31c-106(2)(c) also requires that the party seeking to introduce 
confidential mediation communication show that "the evidence is not otherwise 
available" and "there is a need that substantially outweighs the interest in 
protecting confidentiality." The first requirement is met here. This second 
requirement will be discussed shortly. 
13 
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agreements are exempt from the confidentiality privilege. Similarly, a contract 
may only be exempt from privilege if its existence is not in dispute. Logically, this 
means that the legislature only contemplated allowing written agreements to be 
challenged and did not expect that oral agreements would be exempt from 
confidentiality pursuant to § 78-31 c-106. 
3. This is Not A Circumstance Where 'There is a Need that Substantially 
Outweighs the Interest in Protecting Confidentiality." 
Section 78-3 lc-106(2)(c) also requires that Mr. Reese prove that "there is a 
need that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality" before 
he is entitled to any exemption from the confidentiality privilege. Mr. Reese 
cannot do this. 
As expressed in great detail in LWP's earlier briefs, public policy greatly 
favors the development of a "bright-line" rule prohibiting the enforcement of oral 
agreements reached during mediation. The best approach for this Court is to find 
that oral agreements allegedly reached during mediation are not enforceable 
because the only way to prove the existence of these oral contracts is by disclosing 
confidential mediation communication. 
Under no circumstances involving alleged oral agreements is there "a need 
for evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality." 
Sec. 78-3 lc-106(2)(b). The Court should find that the greatest good is served by 
requiring that all agreements reached during mediation be reduced to writing and 
14 
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find that allowing parties to prove the existence of oral agreement runs afoul of the 
cornerstone of mediation—confidentiality. 
Parties to a mediation can protect themselves by ensuring that all agreements 
reached during a mediation are reduced to writing. If a party fails to reduce an 
agreement to a signed writing, that party is precluded from seeking to enforce the 
alleged oral agreement at a later date. This approach is consistent with the Act, 
which allows for an exemption from the confidential privilege for "an agreement 
evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement." Sec. 78-31 c-
106(l)(a). The Act, however, does not grant an exemption from the confidential 
privilege to prove the existence of an alleged oral contract. See generally, In re 
Acceptance Insurance Company, 33 S.W.3d 443, 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 2000) 
(noting that "communications made by a participant to mediation relating to the 
subject matter of the dispute are 'confidential, [are] not subject to disclosure, and 
may not be used as evidence against the participant in any judicial or 
administrative proceeding.'")(citations omitted)(modifications original)); 
Wilmington Hospital L.L.C. v. New Castle County, 788 A.2d 536, 541 (Del. Ch. 
2001) (noting that "it is inconsistent with the public policy favoring voluntary 
mediation for a court to entertain a motion to enforce a mediation settlement 
agreement that is not reduced to writing and signed by the parties to the mediation 
and the mediator."); Wilmington Hospital 788 A.2d at 542-42("[I]t is consistent 
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with the purpose of [ADR Rules to interpret the rules] as requiring that any 
settlement agreement between the parties to the mediation be reduced to writing 
and signed by them and the mediator as a condition for enforceability. As this 
proceeding itself well illustrates, it is reasonable to expect that such a bright-line 
rule is the best way to protect the confidentiality of the mediation when disputes 
arise over the terms of a putative settlement."); Ryan v. Garcia, 33 Cal.Rpt.2d 158, 
161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("Judicial sifting of statements made at a confidential 
mediation to select those which can be used as evidence of an agreement 
contravenes the legislative intent underlying adoption [of ADR rules.]"). 
D. To the Extent that the Act Allows for the Enforcement of Oral Agreements it 
is a Substantive Change in the Law That Cannot Be Applied Retroactively. 
If the Act is applied to the mediation involving Mr. Reese and LWP, it 
cannot be done so to the extent that it creates a substantive change in the law. See 
B.A.M., 128 P.3d at 1166. If, as Mr. Reese argues, § 78-31c-106(2)(c)(ii) provides 
for an exemption to confidentiality to prove the existence of an oral contract, it is a 
change in the substantive law that cannot be applied against LWP. 
As set forth herein, Mr. Reese, LWP and Tingey Construction agreed that 
the terms of any settlement would be reduced to writing in the form of a 
Memorandum of Understanding. Moreover, the court in Lyons v. Booker, made 
clear that agreements reached during mediation should be reduced to writing so as 
to avoid "the unenviable position of having created an additional dispute on top of 
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a previously existing one." Lyons, 982 P.2d at 1143. If the Act modifies the 
requirement that the agreement would be reduced to writing, it imposes a 
substantive change in the law that cannot be applied retroactively. If the Act 
allows for oral agreements to be enforced it will "'enlarge, eliminate, or destroy"' 
LWP's right to only be bound by written agreements. Goebel v. Salt Lake Southern 
Railroad, 104 P.3d at 1198. This is an unjust result and should not be allow by the 
Court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It appears that the legislature expressed an intent that the Utah Uniform 
Mediation Act apply retroactively. However, even if the Act is applied 
retroactively, it does not apply to this case on appeal. The plain language of the 
Act restricts it applicability only to agreements "to mediate" and not to mediations 
that have already occurred. Moreover, while the Act provides for exceptions to the 
confidentiality privilege, it does not do so to prove the existence of an oral 
contract. The plain language of the Act only exempts written agreements from the 
confidentiality privilege. 
Public policy dictates that this Court adopt a "bright-line" approach and 
preclude the enforcement of oral contracts allegedly reached during mediation. 
The value of mediation is enhanced by requiring that agreements that come out of 
this confidential process be agreements that are in writing and signed by the parties 
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or their agents, after the terms have been spelled out and put down on paper where 
they can be clearly understood. The better reasoned approached is to find that the 
district court erred in allowing Mr. Reese to conduct discovery into confidential 
mediation communication so as to prove the existence of an oral contract to settle. 
The district court's ruling should be reversed and the matter remanded to the 
district court with directions that the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement be 
dismissed for lack of evidence in support thereof. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, on this 1 st day of June 2007. 
DUNN &/DUNN, p.c 
TIM DALTON DUNN, Esq. 
S. GRACE ACOSTA, Esq. 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-6666 
Facsimile: (801)521-9998 
Attorneys for LWP Solutions 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
VI. ADDENDUM 
UTAH UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT 
§ 78-31c-101. Title 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Uniform Mediation Act." 
§ 78-31c-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Mediation" means a process in which a mediator facilitates communication 
and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement 
regarding their dispute. 
(2) "Mediation communication" means conduct or a statement, whether oral, in a 
record, verbal, or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for 
purposes of considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or 
reconvening a mediation or retaining a mediator. 
(3) "Mediation party" means a person that participates in a mediation and whose 
agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute. 
(4) "Mediator" means an individual who is neutral and conducts a mediation. 
(5) "Nonparty participant" means a person, other than a party or mediator, that 
participates in a mediation. 
(6) "Person" means an individual, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, 
partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, 
governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any 
other legal or commercial entity. 
(7) "Proceeding" means: 
(a) a judicial, administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative process, 
including related prehearing and posthearing motions, conferences, and discovery; 
or 
(b) a legislative hearing or similar process. 
(8) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is 
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. 
(9) "Sign" means: 
(a) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol with the present intent to 
authenticate a record; or 
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(b) to attach or logically associate an electronic symbol, sound, or process to 
or with a record with the present intent to authenticate a record. 
§ 78-31c-103. Scope 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2) or (3), this chapter applies to a 
mediation in which: 
(a) the mediation parties are required to mediate by statute, court, or 
administrative agency rule or referred to mediation by a court, administrative 
agency, or arbitrator; 
(b) the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a record that 
demonstrates an expectation that mediation communications will be privileged 
against disclosure; or 
(c) the mediation parties use as a mediator an individual who holds himself 
or herself out as a mediator or the mediation is provided by an entity that holds 
itself out as providing mediation. 
(2) The chapter does not apply to a mediation: 
(a) relating to the establishment, negotiation, administration, or termination 
of a collective bargaining relationship; 
(b) relating to a dispute that is pending under or is part of the processes 
established by a collective bargaining agreement, except that the chapter applies to 
a mediation arising out of a dispute that has been filed with an administrative 
agency or court; 
(c) conducted by a judge who might make a ruling on the case; or 
(d) conducted under the auspices of: 
(i) a primary or secondary school if all the parties are students; or 
(ii) a correctional institution for youths if all the parties are residents of that 
institution. 
(3) If the parties agree in advance in a signed record, or a record of proceeding 
reflects agreement by the parties, that all or part of a mediation is not privileged, 
the privileges under Sections 78-3 lc-104 through 78- 31c-106 do not apply to the 
mediation or part agreed upon. However, Sections 78-3 lc-104 through 78-3 lc-106 
apply to a mediation communication made by a person that has not received actual 
notice of the agreement before the communication is made. 
§ 78-31c-104. Privilege against disclosure—Admissibility—Discovery 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-3 lc-106, a mediation 
communication is privileged as provided in Subsection (2) and is not subject to 
discovery or admissible in evidence in a proceeding unless waived or precluded as 
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provided by Section 78-31 c-105. 
(2) In a proceeding, the following privileges apply: 
(a) A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other 
person from disclosing, a mediation communication. 
(b) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and may 
prevent any other person from disclosing a mediation communication of the 
mediator. 
(c) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other 
person from disclosing, a mediation communication of the nonparty participant. 
(3) Evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery 
does not become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by reason of its 
disclosure or use in a mediation. 
§ 78-31c-105. Waiver and preclusion of privilege 
(1) A privilege under Section 78-3 lc-104 may be waived in a record or orally 
during a proceeding if it is expressly waived by all parties to the mediation, and: 
(a) in the case of the privilege of a mediator, it is expressly waived by the 
mediator; and 
(b) in the case of the privilege of a nonparty participant, it is expressly 
waived by the nonparty participant. 
(2) A person that discloses or makes a representation about a mediation 
communication which prejudices another person in a proceeding is precluded from 
asserting a privilege under Section 78-3 lc-104, but only to the extent necessary for 
the person prejudiced to respond to the representation or disclosure. 
(3) A person that intentionally uses a mediation to plan, attempt to commit or 
commit a crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity is 
precluded from asserting a privilege under Section 78-3 lc-104. 
§ 78-31c-106. Exceptions to privilege 
(1) There is no privilege under Section 78-3 lc-104 for a mediation communication 
that is: 
(a) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the 
agreement; 
(b) available to the public under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records 
Access and Management Act, or made during a mediation session which is open, 
or is required by law to be open, to the public; 
(c) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a crime 
of violence; 
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(d) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit or commit a crime, 
or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity; 
(e) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of 
professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator; 
(f) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), sought or offered to 
prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice 
filed against a mediation party, nonparty participant, or representative of a party 
based on conduct occurring during a mediation; or 
(g) subject to the reporting requirements in Section 62A-3-305 or 62A-4a-
403. 
(2) There is no privilege under Section 78-3 lc-104 if a court, administrative 
agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking 
discovery or the proponent of the evidence has shown that: 
(a) the evidence is not otherwise available; 
(b) there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest 
in protecting confidentiality; and 
(c) the mediation communication is sought or offered in: 
(i) a court proceeding involving a felony or misdemeanor; or 
(ii) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), a proceeding to prove a 
claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of 
the mediation. 
(3) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation 
communication referred to in Subsection (l)(f) or (2)(c)(ii). 
(4) If a mediation communication is not privileged under Subsection (1) or (2), 
only the portion of the communication necessary for the application of the 
exception from nondisclosure may be admitted. Admission of evidence under 
Subsection (1) or (2) does not render the evidence, or any other mediation 
communication, discoverable or admissible for any other purpose. 
§ 78-31c-107, Prohibited mediator reports 
(1) Except as required in Subsection (2), a mediator may not make a report, 
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication 
regarding a mediation to a court, administrative agency, or other authority that may 
make a ruling on the dispute that is the subject of the mediation. 
(2) A mediator may disclose: 
(a) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement 
was reached, and attendance; 
(b) a mediation communication as permitted under Section 78-3 lc-106; or 
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(c) a mediation communication evidencing abuse, neglect, abandonment, or 
exploitation of an individual to a public agency responsible for protecting 
individuals against such mistreatment. 
(3) A communication made in violation of Subsection (1) may not be considered 
by a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator. 
§ 78-31c-108. Confidentiality 
Unless subject to Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act, and Title 63, 
Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act, mediation 
communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by 
other law or rule of this state. 
§ 78-31c-109. Mediator's disclosure of conflicts of interest—Background 
(1) Before accepting a mediation, an individual who is requested to serve as a 
mediator shall: 
(a) make an inquiry that is reasonable under the circumstances to determine 
whether there are any known facts that a reasonable individual would consider 
likely to affect the impartiality of the mediator, including a financial or personal 
interest in the outcome of the mediation and an existing or past relationship with a 
mediation party or foreseeable participant in the mediation; and 
(b) disclose any known fact to the mediation parties as soon as practical 
before accepting a mediation. 
(2) If a mediator learns any fact described in Subsection (l)(a) after accepting a 
mediation, the mediator shall disclose it as soon as practicable. 
(3) At the request of a mediation party, an individual who is requested to serve as a 
mediator shall disclose the mediator's qualifications to mediate a dispute. 
(4) Subsections (1), (2), (3), and (6) do not apply to an individual acting as a judge 
or ombudsman. 
(5) This chapter does not require that a mediator have a special qualification by 
background or profession. 
(6) A mediator must be impartial, unless after disclosure of the facts required in 
Subsections (1) and (2) to be disclosed, the parties agree otherwise. 
§ 78-31c-110. Participation in mediation 
An attorney or other individual designated by a party may accompany the party to, 
and participate in, a mediation. A waiver of participation given before the 
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mediation may be rescinded. 
§ 78-31c-l 11. International commercial mediation 
(1) In this section: 
(a) "International commercial mediation11 means an international commercial 
conciliation as defined in Article 1 of the Model Law. 
(b) "Model Law" means the Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law on 28 June 2002 and recommended by the United Nations General Assembly 
in a resolution (A/RES/57/18) dated 19 November 2002. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (3) and (4), if a mediation is an 
international commercial mediation, the mediation is governed by the Model Law. 
(3) Unless the parties agree in accordance with Subsection 78-3 lc-103(3) that all 
or part of an international commercial mediation is not privileged, Sections 78-
31c-104 through 78-3 lc-106 and any applicable definitions in Section 78-3 lc-102 
of this chapter apply to the mediation and nothing in Article 10 of the Model Law 
derogates from Sections 78-31c-104 through 78-31c-106. 
(4) If the parties to an international commercial mediation agree under Article 1, 
Section (7), of the Model Law that the Model Law does not apply, this chapter 
applies. 
§ 78-31c-112. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act 
This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq., but does not 
modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act or authorize electronic 
delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b) of that act.. 
§ 78-31c-113. Uniformity of application and construction 
In applying and construing this chapter, consideration should be given to the need 
to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states 
that enact it. 
§ 78-31c-l 14. Application to existing agreements or referrals 
(1) This chapter governs a mediation pursuant to a referral or an agreement to 
mediate made on or after May 1, 2006. 
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(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), on or after May 1, 2007, this chapter governs 
all agreements to mediate whenever made. 
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